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“Whether I shall turn out to be the hero of  my own life,” says Dickens’s 
David Copperfield, “or whether that station will be held by anybody else, 
these pages must show.” Are we the heroes of  our own lives? Or are they 
determined by something else? The more various sciences tell us about 
human behavior today, the more they attribute what we do, and think, and 
feel to factors outside our control. They seem to leave little room for anything 
like a “soul” or “self ”—for the notion that we are not only physical beings in 
a physical world, but to some extent self-determined. 
According to one geneticist, the “specter of  genetic determinism” 
is “probably the source of  more public concern than any other question 
about human nature. Are we merely the product of  our genes, directly 
and indirectly? In what sense are we free to act and behave in ways that 
result from our own choices?”2 Religion scholar Martin Marty agrees. “The 
most urgent agenda item on the religion-and-science front,” he says, is 
not cosmology or evolution, but “scientific understandings of  the brain, 
consciousness, will.” “Reduce humans to the chemistry of  neuron firings 
in the brain, and you have crossed a new line. The human is then ‘nothing 
but’ this or that.”3 
Instances of  violent behavior give the question special urgency. After 
the shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007, columnist David Brooks wondered 
if  the student responsible was really responsible. Was he in control 
of  his actions, or was he “like a cork bobbing on the currents of  giant 
forces: evolution, brain chemistry, stress and upbringing”? The question 
applies to all of  us. Is there anything to the qualities we typically associate 
with authentic humanity—qualities that go beyond the mere capacity to 
experience, to respond to stimuli, and include the abilities to reflect, decide, 
act, and assume responsibility. Are human beings free and responsible, 
1A version of  this essay was originally prepared for the Venice Summer School 
on Science and Religion, 2009: Evolution and Human Uniqueness.
2V. Elving Anderson, “A Genetic View of  Human Nature,” in Whatever Happened 
to the Soul, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1998), 68.
3Martin Marty, “Against Reductionism,” Sightings, 23 April 2007 (http://divinity.
uchicago.edu/martycenter/publications/sightingsarchive_2007/0423.shtml).
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centers of  consciousness and bearers of  great value? Are we persons, selves, 
in anything like the conventional sense of  these terms? In other words, are 
we really free? 
Scientific Reductionism
For some people, the scientific study of  human behavior provides a clear answer 
to the question of  freedom, and the answer is No. As they see it, neuroscience 
demonstrates that humans are thoroughly embodied, and everything about 
them is therefore determined. Not only is the mind inseparable from the 
body, but everything there is to us, including all our mental activity, has a 
physical explanation. What is often referred to as “folk psychology,” then, 
the common-sense view that we are somehow distinct from our bodies, in 
charge of  our thoughts and actions at least to some extent, turns out to be a 
mistake.
Philosopher Ted Honderich is one who believes that neuroscience 
contains “more than enough clear hard facts” to settle the time-honored issue 
of  freedom and determinism. Mental events are intimately related to neural 
events, and there are no gaps in the brain’s history. Every psychoneural pair 
is the direct effect of  a previous state of  affairs, forming a continuous causal 
stream that extends back beyond the first moment of  consciousness. There is 
nothing between these events, nor is there anything beyond them. Since our 
minds consist entirely of  neural events, he argues, there is no ongoing “self ” 
or “person” who does the choosing, deciding, and acting. Indeed, the very 
idea of  such a thing is an “embarrassment.”4 
Few state this position so starkly, but others, too, hold that mental states 
are entirely reducible to brain states. Paul and Patricia Churchland, for example, 
are advocates of  “eliminative materialism.” Neuroscientific categories will 
never explain our common-sense concept of  the self, they argue, not just 
because it is difficult to do, but because the very attempt to do so rests on 
a mistake. From what neuroscience has already shown us, they maintain, we 
can be confident that it will eventually demonstrate that there is no such thing 
as the conventional notion of  self, soul, or person,5 so we should abandon 
the concept entirely. Along with now-discarded concepts like phlogiston and 
crystalline spheres, the concept of  the self  is destined for elimination. The 
time is coming when no one will believe in such a thing.6 
Daniel Dennett takes another path to the same conclusion. To be 
consistent, he argues, those who accept evolution as an explanation for the 
4Ted Honderich, How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 35.
5Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1988), 43.
6Ibid., 44.  
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development of  life on this planet should also accept the idea that every aspect 
of  life, including all of  human life, has a material explanation. For Dennett, 
“Darwin’s dangerous idea” is a “universal solvent,” and there is no limit to its 
application, no “cut off ” point where evolutionary accounts end and human 
qualities and characteristics begin. All our mental functions therefore have 
physical explanations. The factors that account for every other aspect of  
life’s history—descent with modification by means of  natural selection—can 
account for all the features of  human life, including thought, decision, and 
action. Darwinism thus dissolves “the illusion of  our own authorship, our 
own divine spark of  creativity and understanding.”7 
Invoking his favorite metaphor, Dennett argues that we should look 
for “cranes” rather than “skyhooks” to explain human behavior, including 
everything the word “mind” traditionally applies to. As he envisions the 
Darwinian universe, there are no skyhooks, no miraculous lifters reaching 
down from outside the system. Cranes do all the lifting, and they rest 
firmly on the ground. Nothing contributes to the process that is not part 
of  the process; nothing stands outside the incremental accomplishments of  
natural selection. “If  we commit ourselves to Darwin’s ‘strange inversion 
of  reasoning,’” Dennett argues, “we [must] turn our backs on compelling 
ideas that have been central to the philosophical tradition for centuries . . . 
[including] Descartes’s res cogitans [thinking substance] as a causer outside the 
mechanistic world.”8
As Dennett sees it, however, this doesn’t diminish the significance 
of  the mind, for the mind is not only produced by cranes, it is a powerful 
crane itself, indeed, “the crane to end all cranes.”9 Equipped with habits and 
methods, mind-tools and information, human brains are capable of  complex 
activity, and their enormous effectiveness surpasses every other form of  life.10 
Nevertheless, everything about us, including consciousness and free will, is 
ultimately attributable to the process of  physical transformation that Darwin 
described. There is no feature of  human life that cannot be accounted 
for by the incremental advance of  complex physical phenomena. Like the 
Churchlands, Dennett concludes not only that we are not significantly free, 
but that there is no “we” as we conventionally think of  ourselves. 
Whatever the evidence that supports determinism, something in us 
deeply resists it. (Even Honderich admits that the idea gets him down). And 
the problem with determinism seems to be precisely what Honderich and 
7Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of  Life (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 63.
8Daniel C. Dennett, “In Darwin’s Wake, Where Am I?” Proceedings and Addresses of  
the American Philosophical Association, 75/2 (November 2001): 23.
9Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 379.
10Ibid., 383.
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the Churchlands take to be its strength, namely, the fact that it eliminates the 
notion of  the self. Eliminate freedom, we cannot help but feel, and something 
essential to our humanity goes out the window with it. As Gary Watson puts 
it, “The problem of  free will is . . . the problem of  finding room in the 
world for ourselves.” It is part of  the “general difficulty in bringing together 
our views of  ourselves both as moral beings and as creatures of  nature.” 11 
The challenge that neurophysiological reductionism presents to us, therefore, 
is whether we can account for both features that seem essential to human 
experience: the fact that we are undeniably physical beings in a physical world 
and the conviction that we are free and self-determined.
 
The Human in Christian Perspective
Materialistic, reductionistic views of  the self  not only arouse existential 
resistance, they also contradict the deep-seated religious conviction that 
human beings are unique among earth’s inhabitants. From the perspective of  
Christianity, human beings belong to the natural order, but the characteristics 
that distinguish them from other forms of  life are not only differences in 
degree but differences in kind, and they confer special abilities and special 
dignity. As creatures in the image of  God, humans reflect the personal qualities 
of  God’s own self; they reflect, decide, and act, and bear responsibility for 
their decisions and actions. 
There are different ways to account for human uniqueness. For centuries 
the “default” explanation12 has been dualism—the idea that the true seat of  
human identity is something nonphysical, an immaterial “mind” or “soul” 
that somehow connects with the physical body, but is not dependent on it. 
There is a long history of  philosophical reflection on the soul thus conceived 
and how it relates to the body. Dualism comes in Platonic, Thomistic, and 
Cartesian varieties. And the idea has some staunch contemporary defenders 
as well, including influential thinkers such as Richard Swinburne13 and J. P. 
Moreland.14 But Seventh-day Adventists have never subscribed to the idea, 
and it has become less and less acceptable to thoughtful Christians generally. 
One important reason is the fact that the Bible fails to support anything 
like an immaterial soul that supervenes upon or exists independently of  
the body. The widespread consensus among biblical scholars today is that 
dualism has no biblical support. The biblical words for “soul” apply to the 
11Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 14.
12I am indebted to Sigve Tonstad for this expression.
13Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of  the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 145-160.
14J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in 
Ethics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000).
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human person as a whole, a totality, not to some immaterial substance that is 
connected to the body during our lives and departs when we die. In the famous 
words of  H. Wheeler Robinson, “The Hebrew idea of  the personality is an 
animated body, not an incarnated soul.”15 More recent studies corroborate 
Robinson’s view. In Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of  Humanity in the 
Bible, Joel B. Green draws his investigation to a close with the observation 
that “our identity is formed and found in self-conscious relationality with its 
neural correlates and embodied narrativity or formative histories. . . . [W]ho we 
are, our personhood, is inextricably bound up in our physicality.” And death 
is “the cessation of  one’s body,” “the conclusion of  bodily life, the severance 
of  all relationships, and the fading of  personal narrative.” This means that, 
at death, the person really dies.” “[T]here is no part of  us, no aspect of  our 
personhood, that survives death.”16  
For Seventh-day Adventists, the Bible will always be the first and last 
court of  appeal in matters of  ultimate significance. But since we believe 
that nature and revelation ultimately agree, we also take seriously evidence 
that comes from other sources. It is not insignificant, therefore, that both 
scientific discovery and philosophical reflection provide reasons for affirming 
the uniqueness of  human experience and the irreducible value of  human 
existence.  
Green’s study of  human nature is particularly interesting because it 
combines a careful analysis of  biblical anthropology with a close look at 
contemporary neuroscience. This dual approach firmly closes the door to 
dualistic accounts of  human uniqueness, but it opens the door to another. 
Although contemporary neuroscience anchors consciousness firmly within 
the physical structure and function of  the brain, it also provides ways to 
account for human uniqueness. 
The Evidence of  Neuroscience
The more contemporary neuroscience discovers about the mind, the more 
apparent it is that mind and body—that mind and brain, to be specific—
are inextricably connected. Thanks in large measure to their study of  
brain damage and degeneration victims, scientists have determined that 
psychological capacities are directly associated with particular locations in the 
brain. Depending on which area of  the brain is involved, “very specific losses 
in the victim’s psychological capacities typically result.” They may lose the 
15H. Wheeler Robinson, “Hebrew Psychology,” in The People and the Book: Essays 
on the Old Testament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925), 362; cited in John A. T. 
Robinson, The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1952), 14.
16Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of  Humanity in the Bible 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 179, emphasis original.
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ability to perceive colors, to recognize faces, comprehend speech, or lay down 
new memories.17 
On the more positive side, “Specific types of  cognition—perceptions, 
memories, emotions—do correlate with specific state changes in specific brain 
regions.”18 Studies of  the prefrontal cortex of  humans and monkeys through 
the use of  electrodes and PET scanning have shown that specific areas of  
the brain are stimulated when certain mental activities occur. And the study 
of  corticospinal excitability through the use of  focal, single-pulse transcranial 
magnetic stimulation applied to the scalp indicates that various moods, the 
presence of  sad or happy thoughts, are related to different hemispheres of  
the brain.19 The list goes on, but the conclusion is clear. The human mind, 
with all its capacities, is inextricably connected to the brain. As Philip Clayton 
puts it, “There is no point in hiding one’s head in the sands of  a prescientific 
age that denied the dependence of  the mental on the physical.”20 
With dualism no longer an option, those who wish to maintain anything 
like the Christian affirmation of  human uniqueness must find another 
alternative to reductionistic materialism. And in recent years a number of  
scholars have been doing exactly that, especially those who identify their 
position as “non-reductive physicalism.” Contra dualism, they assert, we are 
fully material: there is nothing about us that is not involved in the physical 
world. Contra reductionism, however, we are not merely material: there is 
more to human existence than physical processes can fully account for. Even 
though the distinctive features of  human cognition are connected to the 
physical, they are somehow distinguishable from them. 
From this perspective, biology and neuroscience are indispensable to 
our knowledge of  the human, but they do not explain everything about us. 
When a brain exhibits the level of  neurological complexity found in humans, 
these scholars argue, it supports a distinctive type of  mental behavior. New 
qualities develop. Through self-awareness and self-transcendence a human 
being becomes self-directing, or free, in ways that reductionism cannot 
adequately account for. Among the scholars who have contributed to this 
perspective, Nancey Murphy and Clayton are especially well-known. Central 
to their account of  human uniqueness are concepts like “supervenience,” 
“emergence,” and “downward causation.” 
17Churchland, 143.
18Philip Clayton, “Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account,” 
in Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, 
Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering, Michael A. Arbib (Berkley: Vatican Observatory 
Foundation, Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2002), 189.
19Ibid., 184.
20Ibid., 189.
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Reductionism implies that there is only one sort of  causation, namely, 
bottom-up causation. The behavior of  wholes can be explained entirely by 
the behavior of  their parts, and every feature of  an organism can be attributed 
to lower level factors. A careful analysis of  the distinctive qualities of  human 
mentality, however, does not support this explanation. Although there is 
nothing in human experience that does not depend on more simple forms of  
life, complex wholes exhibit qualities that cannot be explained by the laws that 
govern the behavior of  their parts.21 Consequently, bottom-up causation will 
not suffice; we need top-down causation, too.
Organisms from a single cell on up have the capacity of  self-direction. 
They use information to evaluate their actions and adjust them “when 
feedback from the environment indicates a mismatch between the behavioral 
routine and their goals.”22 The more complex the organism, of  course, the 
greater the degree of  flexibility; it is much greater in mam mals than in insects, 
for example. But on the level of  human cognition something appears that we 
find nowhere else. Here we find the capacity to make our own behavior, our 
own cognitive strategy, the object of  attention and evaluation. 
Like all organisms, humans represent a “goal-seeking system,” but they 
also have a “supervisory system” that monitors and evaluates how the system 
as a whole is behaving.23 They can evaluate their evaluations, and adjust their 
behavior accordingly. This explains why human beings need a concept of  the 
self. In order to engage in the distinctly human activity of  evaluating one’s 
own behavior, we need to distinguish between the self  and the other, the non-
self. And we need a “theory of  mind,” too, that is, the recognition that there 
are others who have thoughts and feelings as well as bodies.24 
In spite of  the fact that our cognitive activities have a neural basis, then, 
the laws of  neurobiology do not account for all our activities. Our complex 
neural mechanism makes it possible for us to objectify ourselves and our 
behavior in light of  certain standards or expectations, and to adjust our 
behavior in response. But since these higher-level evaluative processes alter 
neural structure, these abstract goals become “causal factors in their own 
right.”25 There is thus a dimension of  human existence that is inextricably 
connected to our physical components, but cannot be reduced to them. 
As Murphy uses the expression, “supervenience” conveys the idea that 
mental operations are dependent on physical ones—there would be no mind or 
21Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 77.
22Ibid., 87.
23Ibid., 89.
24Ibid., 94.
25Ibid., 102.
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“soul” without the brain—but are not reducible to them.26 This is particularly 
true of  “higher-level mental events, such as deciding, judging, reasoning.”27 
The qualities that make us uniquely human thus exert an influence on the 
physical aspects of  human existence. So, the physical provides an essential 
basis for the mental, and the mental exerts a transforming influence on the 
physical. Moral deliberation nicely illustrates the phenomenon. Moral reasons, 
Murphy observes, “can have top-down efficacy despite the presumed causal 
closure at the neurobiological level.” For example, we can subject to moral 
supervision the fight-or-flight response that kicks in when we find ourselves in 
a threatening situation. Doing so may lead us to seek a nonviolent resolution 
of  the conflict.28 
Clayton employs the notion of  “emergentist supervenience” as a way 
of  conceptualizing the complex connections between the physical and the 
mental in human experience.29 This concept underscores the fact that the 
brain is essential to all mental life. Neurological complexities make possible 
complex mental experience. At the same time, it acknowledges that there are 
aspects of  human mentality that do not reduce to physical phenomena. There 
is “something more” to human life than neuroscience alone can account for. 
Not because neuroscientific accounts are deficient, but because they are 
insufficient—because “there are parts of  what it is to be a person that lie in 
principle beyond their reach.”30 
In addition, “emergentist supervenience” points to the interaction 
between the physical and the irreducibly mental aspects of  our experience. 
As Clayton describes it, the “causal line” moves from the physical inputs and 
the environment to the mental level, then along the line of  mental causation, 
with one thought influencing another, and finally down again to influence 
other physical actions, to make new records and synaptic connections within 
the brain. Consequently, there is only one physical system—the mind is not a 
spiritual substance outside it—but higher level phenomena exercise a causal 
influence on the system as a whole.31 
Emergent supervenience thus provides us with a “science” of  the person 
of  which neuroscience is one, but only one, contributing part.32 It affirms that 
26Nancey Murphy, “Supervenience and the Downward Efficacy of  the Mental: 
A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of  Human Action,” in Neuroscience and the Person: 
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. 
Meyering, Michael A. Arbib (Berkley: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2002), 151.
27Ibid., 155.
28Ibid., 163.
29Clayton, 202.
30Ibid., 188.
31Ibid., 196.
32Ibid., 188.
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mental phenomena depend on physical phenomena, but it also points to the 
fact that mental experience alters the behavior and structure of  the brain. So 
it denies “the reducibility of  the mental to the physical.”33 
For non-reductionists such as Murphy and Clayton, then, human mental 
behavior exhibits qualities that neuroscientific explanations alone could never 
account for. We may share physical, social, and emotional characteristics with 
other forms of  life on this planet. And we may be embodied in physical 
forms as they are, dependent on the external and internal physical resources 
that make life on any level possible. But our complex mental activities make 
us unique among all living things and distinguish our minds from our bodies, 
inseparable though they are. And these features provide a basis for affirming 
the person, or the self, as a reality with its own integrity as well as unique 
responsibilities and dignity. They support the notion that we ourselves, not 
our bodies, brains, or neurons, are the authors of  our actions.34 To answer 
David Copperfield’s question, we are indeed the heroes of  our own lives. 
The Evidence of  Philosophy
Besides the important discoveries of  neuroscience, there is evidence of  
another sort that supports the biblical affirmation of  human uniqueness, 
evidence that is philosophical rather than empirical in nature.  
Suppose we make a basic philosophical move and think about thinking, 
or reflect on the activity of  reflection. In fact, let’s reflect on the work we 
just reviewed by both reductionists and non-reductionists on human mental 
life. It seems clear that participants on both sides of  the issue share a basic 
assumption, whether they endorse reductive or non-reductive accounts of  the 
person. And the assumption is this: the human mind has the ability to arrive 
at knowledge. Otherwise, what point would there be in conducting research, 
drawing conclusions, and formulating arguments? Once we are clear about 
this basic feature of  our thought, the question as to which interpretation of  
the human mind is more adequate—reductionist or non-reductionist—takes 
a different form. For at this point, the question is not, which interpretation 
of  the neuroscientific data is preferable, but which concept of  the mind—
reductionist or non-reductionist—better accounts for this fundamental 
epistemic or cognitive confidence? 
When the issue is posed this way, the advantage clearly goes to the non-
reductionist. Reductionistic materialism not only threatens any concept of  the 
self, it calls into question the very possibility of  knowledge. The very claim 
to know something affirms one’s capacity to know, and this obviously entails 
the existence of  the knowing self. Whenever a person examines evidence and 
draws conclusions, she implicitly affirms herself  as the agent who does so, 
33Ibid., 199.
34Murphy, Bodies and Souls, 109.
78 Seminary StudieS 51 (Spring 2013)
and this is true even when she insists that there is no such thing as agency! 
Paradoxically, the very act of  denying the self  presupposes the existence of  
the self  who makes this denial. 
Self-referential objections to determinism are well-known, of  course. As 
J. R. Lucas puts it, determinism “cannot be true, because if  it was, we should 
not take the determinists’ arguments as being really arguments, but as being 
only conditioned reflexes. . . . Only a free agent can be a rational one.”35 John 
Eccles uses more colorful language. Determinists, he says, “have sawn off  the 
‘rational’ branch on which they like to think they are sitting. How long can this 
levitational delusion be perpetuated by wishful thinking?”36 
For her part, Murphy exclaims, “If  reductionism were true, no rational 
person could accept it because there would be no rational persons!”37 In other 
words, if  the human mind is what reductionists say it is, we would have no 
reason to be reductionists, for in that case our thoughts are physical events 
and nothing more.38  
This self-referential argument assumes a more sophisticated form in 
what is generally described as “transcendental philosophy.” According to 
a dictionary definition, transcendental philosophy examines “the a priori 
conditions of  knowledge, which precede all experience of  objects and which 
are the primary constituents of  all objects of  knowledge and hence make 
knowledge possible.”39 Transcendental philosophers explore the foundations 
of  knowledge as such, both scientific and philosophical, and they hold that 
no account of  knowledge will do unless it takes into account “the thinker’s 
35J. R. Lucas, Freedom of  the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), see § 
“The Presupposition of  Thought;” cited in John C. Eccles, The Human Psyche (Berlin: 
Springer International, 1980), 242.  
36John C. Eccles, The Human Psyche (Berlin: Springer International, 1980), 242. At 
the same time, Eccles, 242, insists that “all materialist theories of  the mind ultimately 
are reducible to determinism.” This obviously puts him at odds with the conclusions 
of  the nonreductive materialists we have mentioned.
37Murphy, Bodies and Souls, 109.
38Reductionists are aware of  these objections to their position, of  course, but 
they are predictably unimpressed by them. For Patricia Churchland, there is no 
contradiction in denying the self ’s existence once we dispense with the mistaken 
concept of  the self. Change the framework and the conundrum of  “believing there 
are no beliefs” will evaporate. Although the only theory readily available to us now 
is the common-sense view that there is a subject of  our beliefs, desires, perceptions, 
sensations, and expectations (Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of  the Mind/Brain 
[Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989], 299), she insists this does not mean that it cannot be 
replaced in the future with a more adequate account of  our experience (ibid., 397).
39Hans Michael Baumgartner, “Transcendental Philosophy,” in Encyclopedia of  
Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi, ed. Karl Rahner (New York: Seabury, 1975), 
1743.
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own act of  knowing.”40 Dispense with the knower and you have eliminated 
any basis for knowledge, any confidence in what the knower claims to know. 
In eliminating the self, reductionist materialists have eliminated any basis 
for confidence in their theory. Put succinctly, reductionism eliminates the 
reductionist. Or, to turn it around, the activity of  reductionists refutes the 
theory of  reductionism. 
No one has pursued issues of  this sort more extensively than philosopher 
Bernard Lonergan. In his most celebrated work, Lonergan undertakes a 
meticulous examination of  human knowing in all its complexity. When we 
review all the operations in which the human mind engages, he argues, from 
sensing and perceiving, through inquiring and understanding, to reflecting 
and affirming, we find that all of  them involve the self-affirmation of  the 
knower.41 
It is important to notice just how this self-knowledge is acquired. It is not 
achieved via a process of  direct introspection of  the sort that, for instance, 
H. D. Lewis invokes in The Elusive Mind. For Lewis, “mental processes are 
of  a quite different nature from physical ones or any observable external 
reality.” They “belong to an entity distinct from one’s body and also from 
any particular feature in the course of  our experiences.”42 For Lewis, then, we 
have the self  on the one hand and the self ’s experiences on the other. 
For Lonergan things are quite different. The self  as he conceives it is 
not an entity apart from, or distinct from, one’s experiences, but the self  
inextricably involved in all one’s cognitive operations. “In Lonergan’s method 
of  introspection,” notes Tracy, “one is not trying to ‘move within’ to capture 
some sudden, illuminating, confrontational and apparently spatial ‘look’ at the 
self-being-conscious-to-the-self.” What is important for Lonergan is not the 
“looked-at,” but the “looker,” that is, the inquirer as conscious—empirically, 
intelligently, rationally, and existentially.43 The “I” that derives its meaning 
from consciousness is “neither the multiplicity nor the diversity of  contents 
and conscious acts but rather the unity that goes along with them.”44
40Ibid., 1745.
41Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of  Human Understanding (New York: 
Philosophical Library Inc., 1970), 319.
42H. D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969), 320. 
Or, as he puts it in a later book, “in addition to states of  mind distinct in nature from 
physical states but constantly interacting with them, there is also a subject, or a self  
or soul, which remains constant and is uniquely involved in all the flow of  our mental 
states or experiences” (The Elusive Self  [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982], 40).
43David Tracy, The Achievement of  Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1970), 102.
44Lonergan, 328.
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From this careful analysis of  consciousness, important conclusions 
follow. If  I ask if  I am a knower, and reflect on what is involved in knowing, 
“the fact of  the asking and the possibility of  the answering are themselves the 
sufficient reason for the affirmative answer.”45 Self-affirmation, therefore, is 
not a logical conclusion from prior premises, but the “explicitation” of  what 
is already at work in the concrete activities of  knowing.46 Lonergan has a high 
estimate of  such self-affirmation. It “can provide a secure and personally 
verifiable guide to all methodical and scientific activity,” he says.47 But most 
important for our purpose, he argues that such self-affirmation is unavoidable 
for anyone making cognitive claims, skeptics included. 
To use Lonergan’s expression, it gives factual self-affirmation the quality 
of  necessity. “Am I a knower? The answer, Yes, is coherent, for if  I am a 
knower, I can know that fact. But the answer, No, is incoherent, for if  I 
am not a knower, how could the question be raised and answered by me?” 
Moreover, the answer, “I do not know,” is equally incoherent. “For if  I know 
that I do not know, then I am a knower; and if  I do not know that I do not 
know, then I should not answer.”48 Any claim to knowledge, according to this 
line of  reasoning, implicitly affirms the self  as knower. The talking skeptic is 
thus mired in contradiction.49
The Evidence of  Personal Courage
To deny the reality of  the self  as eliminative materialists do not only flies in 
the face of  neuroscientific and philosophical evidence, it also comes at great 
personal cost. It would require us to deny qualities that are both essential to 
human existence and universally admired. 
45Ibid.
46Cf. Tracy, 100-101.
47Tracy, 103.
48Lonergan, 329.
49Another “transcendental Thomist,” Karl Rahner, makes the point this way. 
“Even when man would want to shift all responsibility for himself  away from himself  
as someone totally determined from without,” he is the one who does this. And in 
so doing, he “shows himself  to be something other than the subsequent product 
of  such individual elements” (Foundations of  Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea 
of  Christianity, trans, William V. Dych [New York: Seabury, 1978], 30-31.)  Similarly, 
Gordon Kaufman notes, “even thorough-going materialisms are essentially structures 
of  meanings and symbols.” They are not simply collections of  physical noises and 
marks on paper. Humans have created them in the course of  history and intentionally 
used them in particular ways in order to guide human life in the world. They are 
“at once products and examples of  spirit” (In Face of  Mystery: A Constructive Theology 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993], 259).
81Are We reAlly Free? . . .
We began by noting that questions about freedom have immense practical, 
or personal, importance, so it makes sense as we consider them to consult the 
larger scale of  human experience. And here, too—or here especially—we find 
important reasons to affirm human beings as selves, souls, or persons who 
are self-conscious and to some degree self-determined. Consider the cases of  
people such as Gerald Sittser and Victor Frankl. Sittser lost his mother, his 
wife, and one of  his children in a horrible traffic accident. Frankl is a holocaust 
survivor. The reactions of  these two men to their experiences are strikingly 
similar. Though they were victimized by forces beyond their control, though 
their freedom was severely restricted, we might say, they discovered that they 
were free nevertheless. They were free to respond to their situation, and they 
found enormous significance in their capacity to respond.  
Frankl asks, “Is the theory true which would have us believe that man 
is no more than a product of  many conditional and environmental factors—
be they of  a biological, psychological or sociological nature? Is man but an 
accidental product of  these?” “We can answer these questions from experience 
as well as on principle. The experiences of  camp life show that man does 
have a choice of  action.” “Man can preserve a vestige of  spiritual freedom, 
of  independence of  mind, even in such terrible conditions of  psychic and 
physical stress.” “We who lived in concentration camps can remember the 
men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last 
piece of  bread. . . .  [T]hey offer sufficient proof  that everything can be taken 
from a man but one thing: the last of  the human freedoms—to choose one’s 
attitude in any given set of  circumstances, to choose one’s own way.”50 “It is 
this spiritual freedom . . . that makes life meaningful and purposeful.”51 
Sittser makes similar observations. “There is little we can do to protect 
ourselves from these losses,” he notes.  “There is much we can do, however, 
to determine how to respond to them. We do not always have the freedom 
to choose the roles we must play in life, but we can choose how we are going 
to play the roles we have been given.”52 Though not couched in scientific 
or philosophical terminology, these insights nonetheless bear on the subject 
of  this discussion. The loss of  freedom often leads people to appreciate 
how important freedom and self-determination are. And, paradoxically, the 
discovery that one’s freedom is limited is itself  an act of  freedom.
To conclude, neuroscientific data and philosophical reflection provide 
support for the biblical concept of  the self  as free and self-determined. 
50Victor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, rev. ed. (New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1985), 86.  
51Ibid., 87.
52Gerald Sittser, Grace Disguised: How the Soul Grows Through Loss (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1996), 37.
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Despite interpretations to the contrary, neuroscience leads many to conclude 
that mental states are not reducible to brain states, that human beings are 
self-directing and therefore significantly free. And even when people 
conclude from scientific data that we are not free, the very act of  drawing this 
conclusion testifies that we are. Furthermore, our natural admiration for those 
who face great challenges courageously, and rise above tragic circumstances, 
adds intuitive evidence for the conviction that freedom as both a concept 
and a value is something we cannot live without. The biblical affirmation 
that human beings are both creatures and bearers of  God’s image—that they 
are finite, physical, and free—finds corroborating evidence in an impressive 
variety of  sources. 
